


Public Christianity and Te Tiriti o Waitangi: how the “Clapham Sect” reached down under¹

In the highly secular New Zealand of 2010 it is hard to imagine the dominant part that Christians and their faith had in our early story as a nation and in shaping

large impact on our national history. This paper attempts briefly to develop this story.



what has variously been described as its Magna Carta or foundation stone – the Treaty of Waitangi. Any event in history is formed from a complex interweaving of many strands. This paper isolates just one of the significant threads and examines its contribution to what took place in 1840.

It may seem surprising that a relatively small group of Christian activists, who were determined to give public expression to their faith, could have had such a

The Clapham Sect

The “Clapham Sect” was not a sect.² It had no distinctively separate beliefs from the current of evangelical Christianity that had resulted from the eighteenth-century and Methodist revivals. These had stirred the Puritan heritage of the established Church of England and challenged the formalism and corruption of eighteenth-century Christianity. The “sect” was never more than 25 persons, but they were people of influence,

many choosing to live close to each other in the village of Clapham, near London. Many were MPs and they included prominent members of the Board of the East India Company, which then controlled the British-ruled provinces of India.³

What was distinctive about this group was their commitment to living out their Christian faith in public life and their determination to provide a vital Christian presence, not only in Parliament (where they were known as “the saints”), but through their promotion and support of numerous “societies”, providing an active Christian front on almost every issue of the day. They are best known for William Wilberforce’s leader-

“What was distinctive about this group was their commitment to living out their Christian faith in public life and their determination to provide a vital Christian presence ...”

ship of the campaign in Parliament against slavery and succeeded over the course of 20 years in awakening the conscience of the nation, taking on the powerful West Indian slaving lobby – and winning. The film “Amazing Grace” gives a popular and, for the most part, historical

The Missionary movement and the CMS

To gauge the missionary movement’s impact on the colonising of New Zealand, one needs only to look at those colonies that preceded the missionary movement. The American colonies were settled more than 150 years before New Zealand. Australia was first selected as a penal colony 50 years before. The first encounters with “native peoples” in those colonies took place before the missionary movement deriving from the great missionary societies of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the American colonies, evangelising the “Indians” was of little interest. Heroic missionary efforts were made by a few individuals such as David Brainerd and John Eliot, but attracted little support or interest from either the Puritan colonies or Virginia. Australian colonisation began around the time the Clapham Sect was forming, before it had gained real influence. The often brutal encounters with the indigenous peoples in both countries were regarded later in England as deplorable.

By the time New Zealand was first colonised, attitudes towards indigenous peoples had significantly changed and to a large extent the rise of the missionary movement was responsible.

The Clapham Sect played a major part in this improvement. The first missionary societies – the Baptist Missionary Society and the London Missionary Society – owe their origin to William Carey and those who gave him support. The Clapham Sect was not slow in following Carey’s initiative and in 1799 the society which became the CMS was founded with strong support from



account of this campaign.

The story impacts on New Zealand history through the generation of evangelicals following Wilberforce. It does so in three respects which can all be called the legacy of the Clapham Sect:

- a) the missionary movement and the Church Missionary Society (CMS);
- b) the Aborigines Protection Society; and
- c) the dominant presence of the second generation in the Colonial Office.

the Clapham Sect and, given the Clapham Sect members’ Anglican affiliation, the CMS became the evangelical missionary arm of that church. Samuel Marsden, who pioneered missionary endeavour in New Zealand, was a CMS missionary to New South Wales and the first missionaries in New Zealand were from the CMS. They were followed after nearly a decade by members of the Wesleyan Missionary Society, another offshoot of the eighteenth-century revivals.

The Clapham Sect, intertwined with this early movement, used its influence on the Board of the East

India Company and in Parliament to have legislation passed in 1813 granting Christian missionaries access to India. This took a campaign as long as the one pursued to end the slave trade – 20 years.⁴ It was hugely significant for New Zealand 25 years later. The hostility to evangelism in British-ruled territories was broken down and from that point British expansion and missionary enterprise walked hand in hand albeit uneasily at times.⁵ Tomkins describes the impact of the Clapham Sect's contribution thus:

What was at stake in the Clapham Sect's proposals for India was a vision for a new kind of empire. The British Empire in Africa was a matter of mere pillage, that in the Caribbean, slave-driving; British North America

had carried on, as far as possible, as if the native peoples didn't exist; and British India was a secular trading concern. Clapham believed that British presence should improve the world, spiritually, materially, socially and politically; that Britain had the truest religion, the most benign constitution and the most advanced society, and was duty bound to share it.⁶

Astonishingly, in his major recent study on the rise and growth of the "Anglo-World", *Replenishing the Earth*, James Belich omits any mention of the missionary movement as part of the story of British expansion in the nineteenth century.⁷ This illustrates how much ground Christianity has to make up in the public square today.

The Aborigines Protection Society

The abolition of the slave trade in 1807 did not end the work of the Committee on the Abolition of the Slave Trade, but few active steps were immediately taken to renew the battle to abolish slavery itself. Energy initially went into enforcing the abolition of the trade by keeping pressure on the British government to use the Royal Navy to suppress the trade and by gaining international support for the banning of the trade. In 1821, Wilberforce's declining health led him to pass the chair of the Committee to a young MP, Thomas Fowell Buxton, another evangelical Anglican, who was related to Elizabeth Fry and a supporter of various humanitarian causes, particularly the abolition of the death penalty (except for murder).⁸

Younger anti-slavers pressed for a new society, dedicated to opposing slavery. This was formed in 1822 with Buxton as chairman. With the energetic support of Thomas Macaulay and James Stephen the campaign was renewed. It was not until 1833 that abolition was achieved and then only with a huge £20 million compensation to the slave owners. Just before he died, Wilberforce received news that the Bill would pass.

With slavery abolished in 1833, the evangelicals who had supported this measure turned their energy to what they perceived to be the next pressing abuse crying out for attention. They found this in the plight of "native" or aboriginal peoples who had been the victims of exploitation with the expansion of the European powers into the new world. The evangeli-

cals regarded the contact between British colonists and the North American Indians and the Australian Aborigines as having been disastrous for these native races and opposed settlement in any new colonies. The Aborigines Protection Society was formed in 1837.

In its first report, the Society's Committee gave as reasons for its establishment:

The abhorred and nefarious slave traffic, which has engaged for so long a period the indefatigable labours of a noble band of British philanthropists for its suppression and annihilation, can scarcely be regarded as less atrocious in its character, or destructive in its consequences, than the system of modern colonization as hitherto pursued.

The two questions are indeed intimately blended with one another; and the energetic spirit that would universally suppress the slave traffic, cannot rest without a corresponding effort to rescue and elevate the coloured races at large.⁹

Those involved in establishing the Society, including Buxton and a leading Quaker, Dr Thomas Hodgkin, had already in 1836 lobbied Parliament to investigate and report on the treatment of "aborigines" in the British colonies and areas of British expansion. The Parliamentary Select Committee on Aborigines (of which Buxton was a member) produced a report highly critical of the way native peoples had been treated in the course of colonisation. It urged that steps be taken to either prohibit further British colonisation or introduce safeguards to protect native peoples from the expropriation of their land and the destruction of their way of life.¹⁰ Building on this report's impact, Buxton and other evangelicals established the Aborigines Protection Society.¹¹

The second generation of evangelicals in the Colonial Office

In the 1830s, the Colonial Office was dominated by evangelicals who were the second generation of the Clapham Sect. Lord Glenelg, Secretary of State for the Colonies 1835-39, was the son of Charles Grant, a prominent member of the Clapham Sect. Sir James Stephen, the significantly more able Under-Secretary (1836-1847, nicknamed Mr Mother Country and Mr Over-Secretary by E.G. Wakefield and other opponents), was the son of

"The evangelicals regarded the contact between British colonists and the North American Indians and the Australian Aborigines as having been disastrous for these native races and opposed settlement in any new colonies."

Wilberforce's close confidant and brother-in-law, James Stephen. Stephen and Glenelg had close links with those involved in the Aborigines Protection Society and had been Vice Presidents of the CMS, while Stephen had been on the board of the CMS for nine years. Dandeson Coates, Lay Secretary of the CMS, was a powerful influence on the Colonial Office.

There was considerable tension between this alignment of interests (all deeply influenced by the evangelical movement), often referred to as the "humanitarians" who were opposed to colonising New Zealand, and the commercial interests led by Edward Gibbon Wakefield and those involved in the New Zealand Company who were lobbying equally strongly to establish a colonial settlement in New Zealand.¹²

Initially, under the influence of Coates, Glenelg was hostile to any proposals for British settlement of New Zealand and opposed Wakefield's plans for colonisation, but by 1837 he had changed his mind. This was partly due to a new acceptance by the Aborigines Protection Society that the lawless activities of some of the growing number of Europeans now living in New Zealand meant that the best prospect for New Zealand was to permit settlement by hard-working, skilled settlers as advocated by Wakefield and the newly formed New Zealand Association. A merger of the two races would advance religion and the fruits of civilisation. Stephen, who viewed Wakefield very negatively, was persuaded that, left unchecked, the lawless element among existing settlers would exterminate the Maori and Britain should therefore seek to take control of the situation, enforce law and order, and introduce a strict policy to regulate the sale of Maori land.

This view found strong support in a petition taken up by missionaries in New Zealand in early 1837 urging British government intervention to control the growing disorder created by unruly ex-convicts and other violent elements. James Busby, the British Government Resident in New Zealand, also reported on the lawless activities of runaway convicts and other British subjects and claimed that without intervention from the British government there was serious risk that the Maori race would become extinct. Glenelg was persuaded to grant Wakefield's New Zealand Association a charter to settle New Zealand,¹³ believing that under Wakefield's enlightened principles of colonisation a better class of settler would be attracted to New Zealand.

Glenelg, not a decisive person, appears soon to have had second thoughts about the wisdom of permitting a private company to have responsibility for a new colony. Negotiations broke down. The critical point came with a report from Captain William Hobson in

early 1838, returning after a visit to New Zealand. Hobson reported that with 2,000 British residents already in New Zealand, the number of settlers was bound to increase and the British government could not avoid taking responsibility for "establishing law and order in the areas where settlement had taken place". This, he recommended, should be achieved by sending a Government representative to New Zealand to negotiate the cession from Maori chiefs of sovereignty over such parts of the country as might be best adapted for a colony, while future land purchases should be forbidden except through the Crown.¹⁴

It was in this proposal that the Treaty of Waitangi was born. It immediately appealed to Coates of the CMS who, with support from missionaries in New Zealand, was lobbying the Colonial Office strongly against private enterprise being put in control of settlement. Glenelg, increasingly less enamoured of the New Zealand Company, accepted Hobson's plan. With support from

Coates, Captain Hobson was offered the position of consul to New Zealand (later raised in status to Governor) and the Colonial Office began to prepare his instructions.¹⁵ Hobson was known as an evangelical who, on his previous New Zealand visit, had established good relationships with the missionaries.

It is clear from Peter Adams' detailed account of the complex series of events at this time that the humanitarian influence on Colonial Office policy was in the end decisive in the decision to enter into a Treaty with Maori and not entrust the founding of the colony to a private company dominated by settler and commercial interests. As Adams puts it:

The reason for this change of mind lay in the basic sympathy which Glenelg had always had for the evangelical humanitarian argument that European colonization debilitates, demoralizes, and destroys indigenous peoples and their societies, an argument which had constantly been urged by the Church Missionary Society against the New Zealand Association.¹⁶

In this way the Clapham Sect's second generation reached down-under and ensured that, in however fractured a way, European settlement of New Zealand would respect the indigenous people of this country and in its early years would partner with those of a "humanitarian" outlook in New Zealand, the missionaries. New Zealanders today can rightly feel relief that at the time of the Treaty this "humanitarian" outlook won the day against the alternative prospect that Wakefield would have become the first governor and the private New Zealand Company under its commercial charter would have had responsibility for land purchasing and relationships with Maori.

"... the 'humanitarians' ... were opposed to colonising New Zealand, and the commercial interests led by Edward Gibbon Wakefield and those involved in the New Zealand Company who were lobbying equally strongly to establish a colonial settlement in New Zealand."

Hobson and FitzRoy

Before Glenelg could implement this proposal he was forced to resign over difficulties in Canada and it was left to his successor Lord Normanby to carry through the plan. It was under Normanby that the British Government was prepared to consider taking over the whole of New Zealand and treat with Maori on that basis. The Government's hand was forced by Wakefield's attempt to pre-empt Hobson's arrival in New Zealand, by sending the *Tory* and other ships to Port Nicholson (now Wellington) in 1839 to acquire large tracts of land before a treaty could be entered into.¹⁷

Hobson worked closely with the missionaries who were seen as an essential part of British policy for New Zealand. The Colonial Office (and Hobson) distrusted the New Zealand Company and that distrust was increased by the Company's attempted subversion of the Government's actions. Hobson received little co-operation from the Company or other settlers. Missionaries were used to translate the Treaty and explain it to the Maori. Without their backing and support it would have been very difficult for Hobson to have achieved the outcomes the Colonial Office sought.

Hobson's early death made it important that the Governor to succeed him would be able to work closely with the missionaries. Dandeson Coates lobbied for an evangelical, Captain Robert FitzRoy, to be appointed. It is likely that the Aborigines Protection Society also had a close interest in this critical appointment. FitzRoy had a tense period of office plagued by the aftermath of the Wairau "affray" (Hone Heke's "insurrection" in the north) an empty exchequer and few resources, including only a handful of soldiers. British policy was to make the colony self sufficient by obtaining its revenue from land sales. When Maori refused to sell more land, the Governor had no revenue. FitzRoy resorted to dubious methods of land sale by trying to circumvent the Crown's right of pre-emption and so was recalled.

This was a major setback for the missionaries. The evangelicals had already lost their ascendancy in the Colonial Office and the new Colonial Secretary was Earl Grey who was deeply influenced by the legal and political ideas of Vattel (1714-1767; main political work published in 1758) and Locke (1632 – 1704; main political work published in 1689) respectively and took a very different view of the rights of indigenous peoples. Stephen had health problems and resigned soon afterwards in 1847. The CMS and the Aborigines Protection Society were no longer in a position to influence the appointment of the new governor. The next governor, George Grey, who assumed office in late 1845, demand-

ed troops and money in advance and began without the handicaps that FitzRoy had suffered. Grey resented missionary influence and manipulated the newly appointed bishop, George Selwyn (an appointment itself resented by the missionaries), into ousting the leading CMS missionary, Henry Williams.

By 1847, then:

- both the Colonial Office and the direction of government policy in New Zealand were out of evangelical hands.
 - the Colonial Office had passed to Earl Grey and the Whig Party (the party of great land and property owners). The Whigs (and self-interested settlers in New Zealand) were influenced by Vattel's approach to sovereignty, emphasising the European-style nation state and lack of indigenous peoples' rights, and by Locke's views on property rights and use of "wastelands" (i.e. lands that were "wild", being uninhabited or uncultivated).
- The collapse of missionary influence on Colonial Office policy and successive governors led to a corresponding increase in settler influence and demands, reinforced by the growth in their numbers.

"... a successful campaign to hold the Colonial Office and the Governor to the Treaty was fought by the missionaries, backed strongly by the Aborigines Protection Society and the CMS, and this again had lasting implications for Maori/Pakeha relations in New Zealand."

European "wastelands" philosophy

The "wastelands" philosophy significantly altered how land rights and sovereignty were understood after 1840.¹⁸ Adams succinctly puts the critical issue thus:

... the Maoris saw the protection of their lands as the crux of the matter. They had no doubt that all their lands, cultivated or otherwise, were confirmed to them by the Treaty. Neither had William Hobson, who acted on that basis during the brief course of his administration till his death in September 1842. [A different view was put forward by Governor Gipps in Australia and others] based on ... North American experience where European powers, international jurists and the Supreme Court of the United States had all agreed that indigenous peoples, "uncivilized tribes", of any country had merely "a qualified dominium over it, or a right of occupancy only". Therefore the Maoris did not own the waste land in New Zealand but only the land they "occupied" in the sense of cultivated or lived upon. The Crown owned the waste land.¹⁹

On this issue a successful campaign to hold the Colonial Office and the Governor to the Treaty was fought by the missionaries, backed strongly by the Aborigines Protection Society and the CMS, and this again had lasting implications for Maori/Pakeha relations in New Zealand. In 1846, Earl Grey issued instructions to Governor Grey to review and register land titles on the basis that Maori were only entitled to occupied and cul-

tivated land. Governor Grey and many settlers realised that such a move would inflame Maori and be seen as contrary to the promises in the Treaty, but Governor Grey was not prepared to be seen to resist the instruction. The policy provoked a strong reaction and active campaign on the part of all those interests who had supported the Treaty, including Chief Justice William Martin, the missionaries and church leaders such as Bishop Selwyn, all with the tacit support of Governor Grey. Earl Grey backed down and stated that he had no intention of overturning the Treaty.²⁰

Adams explains the significance of this action thus: *Undoubtedly, the most significant outcome of the debate between the Colonial Office and the New Zealand Company about the meaning of the land guarantee was the recognition by the British Government that the Treaty of Waitangi would have to be interpreted according to the way in which the Maori signatories understood it, rather than according to European theories about the land rights of aboriginal peoples.. This recognition prevented the outbreak of a major war or series of wars such as occurred in the 1860s*²¹

But although this battle was won by the humanitarian lobby, the war was lost. The “European theories” had taken a strong hold on settler opinion and when self-government came to New Zealand under the Constitution Act 1852, the colonial Parliament – which was in reality a settler Parliament – introduced measures to facilitate land sales that led, within the next 40 years, to the sale and, after the land wars, the confiscation of most of the “waste-lands”.²²

Treaty translations

So the missionaries and the “humanitarian” lobby in Britain had made sustained, strenuous efforts both to make the imperial encounter with Maori an exception to the harsh experiences of the past, and to preserve both the mana of their chiefs and Maori generally from the depredations of uncontrolled, lawless and destructive Europeans. One of the bitter ironies of this story is that, notwithstanding these efforts, and the price some paid for making them, the missionaries have been accused with varying degrees of animus, by most of the present generation of New Zealand historians, of mistranslating the Treaty, and of providing misleading explanations, thereby deceiving those who trusted them while manipulating Maori into signing the Treaty.²³ Henry Williams, in particular, is said to have either deliberately or negligently softened the Maori translation by avoiding the use of the word *mana* to describe “sovereignty”, whereas it had been used in Busby’s earlier Declaration of Independence of 1835.

Instead Williams, assisted in the translation by his son, Edward, used the word *kawānatanga* derived from the English word “governor”.

Is this where the high ideals of the Clapham Sect and their successors have ended? Is the Treaty – which Henry Williams himself called the Magna Carta of New Zealand – founded on a lie or on what the *Dominion Post*, in a recent article on the Nga Puhi sovereignty claim before the Waitangi Tribunal has called a “fairy-tale”?²⁴

There are a number of difficulties with the mistranslation theory – apart from the unlikelihood that Henry Williams himself acted in the duplicitous way alleged. Professor Alan Ward has recently described Williams as the most “patently honest” of the missionaries.²⁵

The principal debate during the first decade following the Treaty was over the meaning of the second Article. It maintained the guarantee to Maori of their right to retain their land and to dispose of it as they chose. In that respect, the nature of the Crown’s right of pre-emption was the principal concern of Maori at this time, not the first Article, which included the cession of “sovereignty/kawānatanga”. As described earlier, it was the missionaries’ concern (at that time shared by

some leading settlers) that the Treaty should be understood as Maori understood it and this concern was pressed by the missionaries and the Aborigines Protection Society on the British government. This view finds further contemporary support from William Swainson, Attorney-General 1841-1856, who regarded the key question for the chiefs who ceded sovereignty as

“But although this battle was won by the humanitarian lobby, the war was lost. The ‘European theories’ had taken a strong hold on settler opinion and when self-government came to New Zealand under the Constitution Act 1852 ...”

being their concern that they should not “be deemed to have parted with the property in the soil”.²⁶ Article 2 confirmed this right and it was that right that the humanitarians and others demanded that the Colonial Office adhere to in 1845-1846 so as not to break faith with Maori.

Thirty-nine chiefs signed the English version of the Treaty. There does not appear to have been at that time, or later, any suggestion that they questioned the translation or were misled by it.

The mistranslation theory is inconsistent with the affirmation of the Treaty (by then clearly understood as involving the cession of significant authority to the Crown) at the Kohimarama conference in 1860.²⁷ When translating Governor Browne’s explanation of the cession of sovereignty, Donald McLean used the words “nga tikanga nga mana Kawānatanga katoa” to describe “sovereignty”.²⁸ There is no suggestion in any report of the proceedings that Maori believed that these words went beyond what was stated in Henry Williams’ earlier Maori version of the Treaty.

Mana in the Declaration of Independence, 1835

The use of the word “mana” in the Declaration of Independence of 1835 has been made to carry more weight than the context and circumstances surrounding that document can properly bear. Ruth Ross criticises Williams for not using the word “mana” to describe sovereignty in the Treaty “when this same sovereign power and authority [declared in the Declaration] was to be ceded to the Queen by, among others, the very chiefs who had supposedly declared themselves possessed of it in 1835”.

However, it was not the “same” sovereign power and authority that was being ceded by the Treaty. The Declaration was Busby’s attempt to assert an independent sovereignty in the chiefs of the United Tribes. The aim was to confer some form of international standing on the chiefs for reasons of protecting shipping based in New Zealand and providing some form of deterrence against foreign powers, giving the British government some basis for extending its protection to New Zealand.²⁹ No question of preserving mana or authority in the chiefs in relation to their lands was in issue. They were, in effect, asserting their mana against the world. Williams faced a very different situation when translating the word “sovereignty” in translating the Treaty. The chiefs were being asked to cede only some of their chiefly authority. Of course no chief would have signed the Treaty if he was being asked to assign away all chiefly authority, but that is not the issue. Article 2 of the Treaty expressly preserved that authority in relation to lands, estates and other taonga, using the words “tino rangatira-tanga” to describe this. Williams had necessarily to use some lesser word to describe the form of sovereignty he and Hobson saw the chiefs as ceding.

The question that needs to be addressed to reach a view on whether the word “sovereignty” in the Treaty was adequately translated is: what did the framers of the Treaty mean by that word in the **English** version of the Treaty? Apart from Adams, few historians have addressed this question. This is the question to which Duncan Roper has devoted his forthcoming book, mentioned earlier. Roper points out that there was a significant shift in understanding of the meaning of “sovereignty” under the influence of Vattel, and other jurists. This question does however, feature in the evidence given both by Dame Anne Salmond and by Alan Ward, Paul McHugh and Samuel Carpenter at the recent Waitangi hearing on the Ngapuhi claims. Alan Ward’s extended discussion of this issue is most instructive.

Chief Justice Sir William Martin, a strong humanitarian who was close to the missionaries and shared

their concerns, clearly understood “kawanatanga” to refer to sovereignty in terms of only “those rights which were necessary for the government of the country”. The whole of his comment on the meaning of “kawanatanga” and “rangatiratanga” deserves restatement in view of the serious criticisms now being made about Henry Williams’ translation:

The rights which the Natives recognised as belonging thenceforward to the Crown were such rights as were necessary for the Government of the Country, and for the establishment of the new system. We called them “Sovereignty”; the Natives called them “Kawanatanga,” “Governorship.”

This unknown thing, the “Governorship,” was in some degree defined by a reference to its object. The object was expressed to be “to avert the evil consequences which must result from the absence of Law.” To the new and unknown Office they conceded such powers, to them unknown, as might be necessary for its due exercise. To themselves they retained what they understood full well, the “tino Rangatiratanga,” “full Chiefship,” in respect of all their lands.

These rights of the Tribes collectively, and of the Chiefs have been since that time solemnly and repeatedly recognised by successive Governors, not merely by words but by acts. For, through the Tribes and through the exercise of the Chiefs’ power and influence over the Tribes, all the cessions of land, hitherto made by the Natives to the Crown, have been procured.³⁰

Martin arrived in New Zealand as Chief Justice 18 months after the Treaty and was Chief Justice during the formative years that followed until 1857.

He was a noted philologist and familiar with the Maori language – he published a text in Maori educating Maori about their legal rights – and as a trained lawyer and holder of high judicial office³¹ his views on the meaning of the words used in the Treaty deserve great respect. It is clear that he regarded kawanatanga as an entirely appropriate word to translate what the framers of the Treaty understood by “sovereignty”.³² In this respect, the framers of the Treaty appear to have had a very different view of sovereignty from that espoused later by Governor Grey and the settlers under the influence of Vattel’s sovereignty and Locke’s wastelands theory.³³

By 1860 the current had turned strongly against those who had been architects of the Treaty. The “humanitarian” lobby had ceased, well before then, to have influence in the Colonial Office. In New Zealand, power was in the hands of a governor and a settler-controlled Parliament that was openly hostile to the missionaries and the Aborigines Protection Society. The 1846 protest

“The question that needs to be addressed to reach a view on whether the word ‘sovereignty’ in the Treaty was adequately translated is: what did the framers of the Treaty mean by that word in the English version of the Treaty?”

over the meaning of the second Article succeeded because it had the support of many influential settlers, but later actions taken by the Aborigines Protection Society were largely unheeded. The 1852 Constitution Act was challenged as providing insufficient participation for Maori and the changes made in the Constitution when it was enacted in 1854 did little to address those concerns.³⁴ The very serious injustices in the confiscation legislation following the New Zealand Wars of the early 1860s drew strong protests from the Society, which was pilloried by settlers for the “philo-Maori” position it and former Chief Justice Martin took.³⁵ It was not until nearly 150 years later that the extent of those injustices was recognised. Had the Society been listened to, much bitterness could have been avoided.³⁶

The New Zealand Wars of the mid-1840s and the 1860s were then almost inevitable. The voices of those such as Martin who opposed settler policy and advocated a policy of preserving the integrity and mana of Maori society were closely allied to the missionaries, and they, together with the missionaries, were ignored.³⁷

Endnotes

1. A paper presented at the Wellington Theological Colloquium, 27 August 2010.
2. A recent detailed account of the origins and contribution of the Clapham Sect is given by Stephen Tomkins, *The Clapham Sect* (Oxford: Lion Hudson, 2010). Tomkins at p11 attributes the name “Clapham Sect” to James Stephens, son of a celebrated member of the “sect”, writing in an article in the *Edinburgh Review* of 1844.
3. Keith Newman, *Bible and Treaty* (Auckland: Penguin, 2010), 20-26, outlines the connection of the Clapham Sect with New Zealand.
4. Robin Furneaux, *William Wilberforce* (Vancouver: Regent College, 1974), 322-331.
5. For an illustration of the change this brought in India, see William Dalrymple, *White Mughals* (London: Flamingo, 2003).
6. Tomkins, *Clapham Sect*, 123-124.
7. James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
8. The often-repeated assertion that the Clapham Sect was concerned about the plight of slaves on the other side of the world but neglected the plight of the nearby English working classes is a calumny put about at the time by the West Indian slaving lobby and taken up by Richard Cobbett, noted for his extravagant attacks on opponents. In fact, although their principal efforts went into the abolition of slavery, moral reformation and the opening up of India to missionaries, they were active in numerous causes to improve the position of the English poor, such as reforms in factories, prison, and the treatment of convicts which gave the impetus to Lord Shaftesbury’s reforms in the next generation. Sadly, Keith Sinclair repeats this quite unfounded accusation in *The Origins of the Maori Wars* (Wellington: New Zealand University Press, 1957), 23: “In the early nineteenth century the humanitarian movement, with little exception, provides the ignoble spectacle of solicitude for the savage but not the industrial poor.” Better founded is the accusation that they opposed trade unions and supported Pitt’s measures to suppress dissent, but it must be recognised that this was the period of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars.
9. *First Annual Report of the Aborigines Protection Society* 1838, Cornell

University Reprint.

10. Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines 1836, reprinted 1966 by C. Srtuick, Capetown.
11. Samuel Carpenter, *Te Wiremu, Te Puhipi, He Wakaputanga Me Te Tiriti, Report Commissioned by Waitangi Tribunal* (November 2009, WAI 1040, Record of Inquiry Doc A17), 11, n29, refers to correspondence between James Busby and Buxton. Busby was very likely a supporter of the Aborigines Protection Society.
12. Sinclair, *Maori Wars*, 24-26; Claudia Orange, *The Treaty of Waitangi* (Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 23-31.
13. Peter Adams, *Fatal Necessity* (Auckland: Auckland UP / Oxford UP, 1976), 108.
14. Adams, 128-129; Newman, *Bible and Treaty*, 142-145.
15. Adams, 119, 124-129.
16. Adams, 132.
17. Patricia Burns, *Fatal Success* (Auckland: Heinemann Reed, 1989), 96-97.
18. A significant treatment of this whole issue is given by Dr Duncan Roper in a study nearing completion and expected to be published next year.
19. *First Annual Report of the Aborigines Protection Society* 1838, Cornell University Reprint.
20. Orange, *Treaty of Waitangi*, 126-131. The imperial Parliament’s Wastelands Amendment Act 1846 stated that the Wastelands Act 1842 was not to apply to New Zealand.
21. Adams, 207.
22. Adams, 209.
23. This mistranslation theory was first put forward by Ruth Ross in “Te Tiriti o Waitangi: texts and translations”, *New Zealand Journal of History* vol 6 no 2 (1972) 129 -157. It was recently reiterated by Dame Anne Salmond before the Waitangi Tribunal in the Nga Puhi claims.
24. “The Fight for Truth”, *Dominion Post* (16 October 2010).
25. See Brief of Evidence of Professor Ward, dated 17 December 2009, (Wai 1040 #A19), 111.
26. William Swainson, *New Zealand and its Colonization* (London: Smith Elder & Co, 1859), 81.
27. Orange, *Treaty of Waitangi*, 145-154 discusses the Kohimarama conference in some detail. She states that “the most important idea that Maori took away from the Conference was that their mana was guaranteed”.
28. Ruth Ross, “Te Tiriti”, 139 citing *Te Karere Maori*, Auckland, 14 July 1860, 6. Ross observes that later when Donald McLean near the close of the conference` cited the Treaty again he did so from Williams translation but gave no explanation for the differences between this and his own translation cited earlier.
29. Orange, *Treaty of Waitangi*, 21.
30. Sir William Martin, *The Taranaki Question*, 1860 available at www.NZETC.org.tn/scholarly/tei-martara-ti-body-d1-d1-.html
31. G.P. Barton QC, “William Martin”, in W.H. Oliver (ed), *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography* Vol 1 (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1990), 277-279.
32. Ruth Ross refers to this statement by Martin at p140 of her article. She dismisses it as being “missionary Maori”, but that is not the issue. The question rather is whether, missionary Maori or not, the word was understood by Maori. Ross acknowledges that Maori were familiar with use of the term *kawana* to describe the Australian governors, and were aware of its use in scripture and the liturgy. Ross could have added that Maori were certainly using the word to refer to the mana and deference given to Hobson.
33. The evidence of historians Professor Alan Ward and Samuel Car-

penter given to the Waitangi Tribunal on the Nga Puhī claims (WAI 1040) is instructive in this respect. See especially paras 15 to 18 of Ward's evidence (Doc #A19) and pp7-9 of Samuel Carpenter's (Doc #A17).

34. Carpenter, 138-139.

35. William Fox, *The War in New Zealand*, ch 10 and Orange, *Treaty of Waitangi*, 164. Fox unfairly blamed the Society for resisting the initial confiscation proposals which, if adopted, he claimed would have led to smaller areas being confiscated.

36. The protest by Octavius Hadfield and other missionaries over the Waikato war was not a united action as the missionaries were divided on this issue and lost much mana over this. See John Stenhouse,

"Religion, Politics and the New Zealand Wars 1860-1872" in John Stenhouse and Rex Adhar, *God and Government* (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2000).

37. On the overall contribution of the Aborigines Protection Society and the "humanitarians" to this period of New Zealand history see Raymond M. Cooke, "Two Faces of Philanthropy: the Aborigines Protection Society and the Treaty" *Journal of Religious History*, Vol 5 No 1 (1968).



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Meditation 2 – Bread



Life is a participation – death is cessation, dissolution; "in" death nothing participates for nothing is no-thing and no connection. But infinitely deeper than that, at the root, and infinitely all around, participation shapes the ceaselessly spreading branches of the tree of life.

Consummation is consumption without loss. The fire is all-in-all always. The oil never ceases to flow and the widow has her rest. The wood is ever-renewed – ever-green, its leaves heal us all. Here, the leavened bread of celebration falls forever from heaven. Here lovers, hand in hand, stand together amidst the flames, consumed and yet unscathed – God is their judge and the Son of Man remains with them at their side. This is the consummation of creation, this ceaseless interpenetration in the all-consuming, all-renewing Flame. Here is love ...

Life is ecological – life is interdependent, interconnected, embedded, embodied, incarnate.

In 1 Corinthians 10:16-17 Paul wrote,
Is not the cup of thanksgiving for which we give thanks a participation in the blood of Christ? And is not the bread that we break a participation in the body of Christ? Because there is one loaf, we, who are many, are one body, for we all partake of the one bread.

We translate the Hebrew word *chai* as "life"¹ and the Hebrew word *lachem* as "bread".² In the Semitic view of things, life and bread share a close semiotic relationship. Grain, and so, bread, was the staple food – the difference between life and death – in the ancient Middle East, as it is in many cultures today. The association of life and bread is easily intuited.

In Semitic culture, to eat another's bread is to become kin with him.

On the night he was betrayed Jesus enjoined his followers to take and eat and drink together with him. In our communion around the Lord's Table, as we share bread and wine together in memory of his death for us, our kinship with him is revealed.

Both Matthew and Luke tell us that Jesus was born in Bethlehem – Bethlehem the "House of Bread", the town where Ruth, the young Moabite widow, gleaned

grain and found favour, salvation, renewed life, with Boaz, the namesake of the left-hand entrance pillar of the House of Yahweh in Jerusalem. The loving friendship of Ruth with her mother-in-law had life-giving consequences – Boaz' household became one of open covenantal inclusion, a household within which Naomi too found her place and pleasure.

David, Israel's beloved second king was born in Bethlehem. Jesus' whakapapa includes him in the house of David.

In the overall Jesus story, the House of Bread has significance as a sign. At the beginning of Jesus' human life he indwells the bread. We come to understand that he indwells the bread which we eat among us even as we, by our baptism, indwell him.

By baptism we indicate that we participate in Jesus' death and resurrection life. It is attributed to Francis of Assisi that he said, "...it is in dying that we are born to eternal life." In our baptism death becomes birth. By our communion with each other in Jesus, communication and consumption interpenetrate – "I am the bread of life ..." he says (cf. Jn 6). Amid the words by which we recognise the body and blood of the Lord, there is an awe-ful silence.

The silence of the Lamb

Our sarcophagus
could not swallow you.
So, at first,
in fear and trembling,
but then in increasing
relish,
I ate you
with a cup of wine
and some good bread,
only to find myself
being carefully,
dreadfully,
purposively,
consumed
by you.



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